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Measuring Information Leakage in
Non-stochastic Brute-Force Guessing
Farhad Farokhi, Senior Member, IEEE, Ni Ding, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We propose an operational measure of information
leakage in a non-stochastic setting to formalize privacy against
a brute-force guessing adversary. We use uncertain variables,
non-probabilistic counterparts of random variables, to construct
a guessing framework in which an adversary is interested in
determining private information based on uncertain reports.
We consider brute-force trial-and-error guessing in which an
adversary can potentially check all the possibilities of the private
information that are compatible with the available outputs to
find the actual private realization. The ratio of the worst-
case number of guesses for the adversary in the presence of
the output and in the absence of it captures the reduction
in the adversary’s guessing complexity and is thus used as
a measure of private information leakage. We investigate the
relationship between the newly-developed measure of information
leakage with the existing non-stochastic maximin information
and stochastic maximal leakage that are shown arise in one-shot
guessing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, maximal leakage based on one-shot guessing [1]
and guessing leakage based on brute-force guessing [2] have
been developed to provide operational information-leakage
metrics for privacy analysis. These notions have started a
new wave of research in information-theoretic privacy with
interpretable or operational measure of private information
leakage [3], [4]. In some cases, however, probability distri-
butions of the underlying variables or conditional probability
of outputs given private data might not be known a priori
or might change unpredictably over time. For instance, when
considering small datasets, enough data might not be available
to make probabilistic inference about the population and, thus,
we may want to investigate whether an adversary can gain
private information that is not based on statistics. Alterna-
tively, we may need to avoid randomized policies for privacy
preservation. For instance, this could be due to concerns
about un-truthfulness in privacy-preserving reports [5], [6] or
complications in financial auditing and fraud detection [7],
[8]. Therefore, in these cases, there is a need to investigate
information leakage in non-stochastic frameworks.
In this paper, we propose a measure of information leakage
in a non-stochastic framework. We do so to provide an inter-
pretation for the recent results on non-stochastic privacy [9]–
[11]. We use uncertain variables, non-stochastic counterparts
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of random variables introduced in [12], to construct a guessing
framework in which an adversary is interested in determining
private information based on available outputs. We consider a
brute-force guessing setup in which an adversary potentially
checks all the possibilities of the private information that are
compatible with the outputs to find the actual realization of
the private information. This is similar to the interpretation
of [1] for password guessing or side-channel attacks on cipher
systems in which an adversary can repeatedly checks all the
possible combinations that are compatible with its observa-
tions. However, the approach of [1] is based on the probability
of successful deduction/inference with just one guess while
we use the number of guesses in a repeated scenario. This
is similar to the brute-force guessing framework in [2] with
the exception of avoiding distributions or statistics. The ratio
of the worst-case number of guesses for the adversary in the
presence of the outputs and in the absence of them captures
the reduction in the adversary’s guessing complexity and is
thus used as a measure of information leakage.
Although a brute-force interpretation of leakage is used
in this paper, we follow the axioms1 of [1] for guiding the
development of the information leakage metric. These axioms
are, in fact, relevant to any notion of information leakage.
Therefore, we require that the introduced information-leakage
metric (R1) explain leakage in an operational manner (what
bounding leakage means in practice), (R2) require minimal
assumptions about the privacy-intrusive adversary, (R3) satisfy
properties, such as (R3.a) data-processing inequality (post
processing does not increase leakage), (R3.b) independence
property (independent outputs result in zero leakage), and
(R3.c) additivity property (akin to composition rule in dif-
ferential privacy), and finally, (R4) accord with intuition.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Proposing a non-stochastic brute-force guessing frame-
work for measuring information leakage in which the ra-
tio of the worst-case number of guesses for the adversary
in the presence of the output and in the absence of it is
used to capture the reduction in the adversary’s guess-
ing complexity and to define a measure of information
leakage;
• Measuring leakage from the private data to the outputs
when we are aware of adversary’s intentions (i.e., what
sensitive attribute/data it wants to guess) and when we are
not aware of the adversary’s intentions, which is defined
based on the maximal information leakage;
1Not all the requirements in [1] are axioms, e.g., the requirement for the
leakage to accord with intuition, but most can be regarded as fundamental
properties required for private information leakage metric.
2• Demonstrating that the non-stochastic brute-force leakage
satisfies the axioms outlined for information leakage
in [1], such as operational interpretation, minimality of
assumptions on the adversary, data-processing inequality,
independence property, and additivity;
• Presenting identifiability, a new notion of privacy based
on the developed maximal measure of information leak-
age, in this paper;
• Relating the non-stochastic information leakage based on
the presented brute-force guessing framework to max-
imin information [12], which we prove that stems nat-
urally from one-shot guessing with perfect accuracy, and
stochastic maximal leakage, which is shown to relate to
stochastic one-shot guessing [1].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
preliminary material on uncertain variables and non-stochastic
information theory in Section II. In Section III, we present the
measure of information leakage of a specific sensitive attribute
to the output and use it as the privacy measure when we are
aware of adversary’s intentions. In Section IV, we extend this
notion to when we are not aware of the adversary’s intentions
by defining maximal non-stochastic brute-force leakage. We
present non-stochastic identifiability as a new notion of non-
stochastic privacy in Section V. We compare the brute-force
notion of non-stochastic information leakage with one-shot
guessing measures, such as maximin information and stochas-
tic maximal leakage in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VII.
II. UNCERTAIN VARIABLES
We borrow the following concepts from [12]. Consider
uncertainty set Ω. An uncertain variable, uv in short, is a
mapping on Ω. For example, for uv X : Ω → X, X(ω) is
the realization of uv X corresponding to uncertainty ω ∈ Ω.
For any two uvs X and Y , the set JX,Y K := {(X(ω), Y (ω)) :
ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ JXK × JY K is their joint range. For uv X ,
JXK := {X(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} denotes its marginal range. The
conditional range of uv X , conditioned on realizations of uv
Y belonging to the set Y , is JX |Y (ω) ∈ YK := {X(ω) :
∃ω ∈ Ω such that Y (ω) ∈ Y} ⊆ JXK. If Y = {y} is a
singleton, JX |Y (ω) ∈ {y}K = JX |Y (ω) ∈ YK is replaced
with JX |Y (ω) = yK or JX |yK when it is clear from the
context. For any two uvs X and Y , we define the notation
JY |XK := {JY |X(ω) = xK, ∀x ∈ JXK}. We sometimes
refer to JY |XK as a non-stochastic channel as JY |XK fully
characterizes the non-stochastic communication channel from
X to Y . In this paper, we only deal with discrete uvs
possessing finite2 ranges.
Uvs X1 and X2 are unrelated if JX1|X2(ω) = x2K = JX1K
for all x2 ∈ JX2K and vice versa. Similarly, X1 and X2 are
conditionally unrelated given Y if JX1|X2(ω) = x2, Y (ω) =
yK = JX1|Y (ω) = yK for all (x2, y) ∈ JX2, Y K. Uvs Xi, i =
1, . . . , n, are unrelated if JX1, . . . , XnK = JX1K× · · · × JXnK
and conditionally unrelated given Y if JX1, . . . , Xn|Y (ω) =
yK = JX1|Y (ω) = yK×· · ·× JXn|Y (ω) = yK for all y ∈ JY K.
2Extension to countably infinite sets is straightforward with extra care when
manipulating extended real numbers (i.e., infinity).
Uvs X , Y , and Z form a Markov (uncertainty) chain, denoted
by X − Y − Z , if X and Z are unrelated conditioned on Y ,
that is, JX |Z(ω) = z, Y (ω) = yK = JX |Y (ω) = yK for all
(z, y) ∈ JZ, Y K. Note that, by symmetry of the definition of
unrelated uvs, X−Y −Z forms a Markov chain if and only if
Z−Y −X forms a Markov chain. We say X1−X2−· · ·−Xn
forms a Markov chain if Xi−Xj−Xℓ forms a Markov chain
for any 1 ≤ i<j<ℓ ≤ n.
Non-stochastic entropy of uncertain variableX is defined as
H0(X) := log2(|JXK|). This is often described as the Hartley
entropy [12], [13], which coincides with the Rényi entropy
of order 0 for discrete variables [14], [15]. Conditional (or
relative) entropy of uv X given Y is given by H0(X |Y ) :=
maxy∈JY K log2(|JX |Y (ω) = yK|). This is the Arimoto-Rényi
conditional entropy of order 0 [14], [16]. Based on this, we
can define I0(X ;Y ) := H0(X)−H0(X |Y ). This is equivalent
to the 0-mutual information [14], [17].
We end this section by presenting the definition of max-
imin information from non-stochastic information theory [12].
Consider uvs X and Y . Any x, x′ ∈ JXK are JX |Y K-overlap
connected if there exists a finite sequence of conditional
ranges {JX |Y (ω) = yiK}ni=1 such that x ∈ JX |Y (ω) = y1K,
x′ ∈ JX |Y (ω) = ynK, and JX |Y (ω) = yiK ∩ JX |Y (ω) =
yi+1K 6= ∅ for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. We say A ⊆ JXK
is JX |Y K-overlap connected if all x, x′ ∈ A are JX |Y K-
overlap connected. Further, A,B ⊆ JXK are JX |Y K-overlap
isolated if there does not exist x ∈ A, x′ ∈ B such that x, x′
are JX |Y K-overlap connected. An JX |Y K-overlap partition is
a partition of JXK such that each member set is JX |Y K-
overlap connected and any two member sets are JX |Y K-
overlap isolated. There always exists a unique JX |Y K-overlap
partition [12], which is denoted by JX |Y K⋆. The maximin in-
formation is I⋆(X ;Y ) := log2(|JX |Y K⋆|). In [12], it is proved
that |JX |Y K⋆| = |JY |XK⋆| and thus I⋆(X ;Y ) = I⋆(Y ;X).
The overlap partition captures common uv [18], an extension
of common random variable [19] to uvs. This relationship
explains the relationship between entropy of the common uv,
which is equal to the maximin information, and the zero-error
capacity [12], [19].
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN BRUTE-FORCE GUESSING
Consider uv X containing sensitive data U , which is inter-
preted as some attribute or feature of X that is computable
by some function g : JXK → JUK, i.e., U = g ◦X . Note that,
by construction, |JUK| ≤ |JXK|. Let Y be an observable uv
that depends on X , e.g., X and Y are the input and output,
respectively, of a (privacy-preserving) channel.3 These uvs
forms a Markov chain U − X − Y . An adversary wants to
guess U correctly given Y . For instance, consider an example
in which X captures weight and height of an individual, and
U denotes body mass index. In such an example, insurance
agencies might be interested in deducing the body mass index
of an individual (due to its correlation with heart disease)
based on publicly released data Y while they do not have
3The conditional range JY |XK characterizes this channel, which can also
be regarded as a non-stochastic privacy-preserving scheme.
3any particular interest in learning an individual’s height and
weight separately.
We assume that the adversary can guess the value of U
in a brute-force trial-and-error manner. That is, the adversary
chooses a distinct element u ∈ JUK each time and tests4
whether the actual value U(ω) equals u. The adversary repeats
this procedure until the answer is ‘yes’. We consider the num-
ber of trials before the successful guess. Without observations
of Y , the adversary must try at most |JUK| times. However,
with access to observation Y (ω) = y ∈ JY K, the actual value
of U(ω) lies in the conditional range JU |Y (ω) = yK and there-
fore the maximum number of trials is |JU |Y (ω) = yK|. Since
the number of trials is proportional to the inference cost/effort
of the adversary, the ratio |JUK|/|JU |Y (ω) = yK| captures the
reduction in the adversary’s maximum cost for guessing U
upon the observation JU |Y (ω) = yK. This coincides with the
definition of the information gain log2(|JUK|/|JU |Y (ω) = yK|)
in [20], where log2(|JU |Y (ω) = yK|) denotes the ‘combinato-
rial’ conditional entropy. The adversary’s reduction in guessing
cost can be interpreted as the information gained about uv U
from the observation Y (ω) = y.
Note that the measure log2(|JUK|/|JU |Y (ω) = yK|) is also
consistent with the stochastic brute-force guessing leakage
HG(U)−EY [HG(U |Y (ω) = y)] proposed in [2, Definition 3]
for rvs U and X . This measure is based on the guessing
entropy5 in [21] defined as HG(U) :=
∑|JUK|
i=1 iP{U(ω) =
ui}, where (ui)
|JUK|
i=1 are such that P{U(ω) = u1} ≥
P{U(ω) = u2} ≥ . . . ≥ P{U(ω) = u|JUK|}. Similarly,
the conditional guessing entropy is HG(U |Y (ω) = y) =∑|JU|Y (ω)=yK|
i=1 iP{U(ω) = u˜i|Y (ω) = y} for each y ∈ JY K,
where (u˜i)
|JU|Y (ω)=yK|
i=1 are such that P{U(ω) = u˜1|Y (ω) =
y} ≥ P{U(ω) = u˜2|Y (ω) = y} ≥ . . . ≥ P{U(ω) =
u˜|JU|Y (ω)=yK||Y (ω) = y}. When there is no σ-field or prob-
ability measure over JUK, HG(U) and HG(U |Y (ω) = y)
reduce to the prior guessing cost log2(|JUK|) and posterior
guessing cost log2(|JU |Y (ω) = yK|), respectively, by re-
placing the expectation with the worst-case. To quantify the
non-stochastic brute-force guessing leakage, we consider the
difference between log2(|JUK|) and the minimum guessing
cost miny∈JY K log2(|JU |Y (ω) = yK|) as follows.
Definition 1 (Non-Stochastic Brute-force Guessing Leakage).
For a given uv U , the non-stochastic leakage from U to Y is
L(U → Y ) = log2
 |JUK|
min
y∈JY K
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|

= max
y∈JY K
log2
(
|JUK|
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|
)
.
The measure L(U → Y ) quantifies the maximum reduction
in the guessing cost of the adversary after observing Y , which
indicates the most information gained by the adversary in the
4We assume that the adversary has access to an oracle that can determine
whether U(ω) is equal to u (for a given u ∈ JUK) or not.
5The guessing entropy HG(U) denotes the minimum average number of
trials for guessing the realization of U . This results from the optimal brute-
force guessing strategy of the adversary to pick ui ∈ JUK, i.e., the element
in JUK with the i-th largest probability P{U(ω) = ui}, at the i-th trial [21].
sense of [20]. This measure has been previously used as the
non-stochastic information leakage in [9], [10] for privacy
analysis, e.g., in the case of k-anonymity [9]. Hence, this
definition provides an operative meaning to the non-stochastic
information leakage and can be used as its interpretation for
privacy analysis.
In the following proposition, we show that non-stochastic
leakage satisfies the data-processing inequality. This implies
that, for a given uv X and a specified attribute U of X , the
leakage is non-increasing along cascading channels JY |XK and
JZ|Y K. This is in line with axiom R3.a of an operational notion
of information leakage in [1]. This is an important requirement
as it shows that a curator does not need to worry about an
increased risk incurred by any post processing after releasing
outputs.
Proposition 1 (Data Processing Inequality). If Markov chain
U −X − Y − Z holds, L(U → Z) ≤ L(U → Y ).
Proof: Note that
JU |Z(ω) = zK =
⋃
y∈JY K
JU |Z(ω) = z, Y (ω) = yK
=
⋃
y∈JY K:(y,z)∈JY,ZK
JU |Y (ω) = yK,
where the last equality follows from that U − Y − Z is a
Markov chain, i.e., U and Z are unrelated given Y . Notice that
y ∈ JY K and (y, z) ∈ JY, ZK implies that y ∈ JY |Z(ω) = zK.
As a result,
JU |Z(ω) = zK =
⋃
y∈JY |Z(ω)=zK
JU |Y (ω) = yK. (1)
Let z∗ ∈ argminz∈JZK |JU |Z(ω) = zK|. For any y
∗ ∈
JY |Z(ω) = z∗K, JU |Y (ω) = y∗K ⊆ JU |Z(ω) = z∗K because
of (1). Hence,
min
y∈JY K
|JU |Y (ω) = yK| ≤ |JU |Y (ω) = y∗K|
≤ |JU |Z(ω) = z∗K|
= min
z∈JZK
|JU |Z(ω) = zK|,
which, because of the monotonicity of the logarithm, gives
rise to the inequality L(U → Z) ≤ L(U → Y ).
The following result shows that the non-stochastic brute-
force guessing leakage is a measure of relatedness between
two uvs. In fact, the leakage is equal to zero if two uvs are
unrelated. Evidently, the most private case arises from ensuring
that X and Y are unrelated. In this case, the realizations
of Y do not provide any useful information about X or its
derivatives, e.g., U . This is again in line with axiom R3.b of
an operational notion of information leakage [1].
Proposition 2 (Bounding Leakage). L(U → Y ) ≥ 0 with
equality if X and Y are unrelated.
Proof: The inequality follows from that JU |Y (ω) = yK ⊆
JUK and, as a a result, |JUK|/|JU |Y (ω) = yK| ≥ 1. If X
and Y are unrelated, U and Y are unrelated too. Therefore,
JU |Y (ω) = yK = JUK. This shows that L(U → Y ) = 0.
4For the Markov chain U −X−Y , the measure L(U → Y )
can be used to quantify the non-stochastic brute-force guessing
leakage if we know attribute U of X that is targeted by the
adversary. However, there are some real-world situations that
we do not know a priori the intention of the adversary, i.e.,
the attribute U of X that the adversary is trying to infer. In
some cases, more than one user may observe Y and each
user might be interested in guessing/estimating a different
attribute of X . In these situations, it is required to consider the
brute-force guessing leakage L(U → Y ) when the attribute U
varies. Therefore, we need to define a maximal non-stochastic
guessing leakage. This is in-line with axiom R2 in [1]. We
consider such situations in the next section.
IV. MAXIMAL NON-STOCHASTIC LEAKAGE
For given uv X and the released output Y , we define the
maximal non-stochastic brute-force guessing leakage over all
attributes U as follows.
Definition 2 (Maximal Non-Stochastic Brute-Force Leakage).
The maximal non-stochastic leakage from X to Y is defined
as
L⋆(X → Y ) = sup
U : U−X−Y
L(U → Y ), (2)
where the supremum is taken over all functions g : JXK → JUK
with JUK containing finite arbitrary alphabets.
The maximal non-stochastic brute-force leakage only de-
pends on uvs X and Y . The maximizer of (2) denotes the
most vulnerable attributes U to the brute-force guessing over
JY |XK; The supremum of (2) indicates the lowest data privacy
level the channel JY |XK provides.
Now, we can show that maximal non-stochastic leakage
admits axiom R3 in the axiomatic approach to operational
information leakage in [1]. That is, maximal non-stochastic
leakage satisfies data processing inequality (post processing
does not increase leakage), independence property (statistically
independent outputs result in zero leakage), and additivity
property.
Proposition 3 (Properties of Maximal Leakage). The follow-
ing holds:
a) L⋆(X → Y ) ≥ 0;
b) L⋆(X → Y ) = 0 if and only if X is unrelated to Y ;
c) L⋆(X → Y ) ≤ H0(X) with the equality if Y = X;
d) L⋆(X → Z) ≤ L⋆(X → Y ) if Markov chain X−Y −Z
holds;
e) If (Xi, Yi), ∀i, are unrelated, i.e., (Xi, Yi) and (Xi′ , Yi′)
are unrelated ∀i 6= i′, then
L⋆((X1, . . . , Xn)→ (Y1, . . . , Yn)) =
n∑
i=1
L(Xi → Yi).
Proof: Proof of (a): Note that L(U → Y ) ≥ 0 for all U
such that U − X − Y is a Markov chain; see Proposition 2.
Taking maximum of both sides of this inequality results in (a).
Proof of (b): According to Proposition 2, for unrelated X
and Y , L(U → Y ) = 0 for all U such that U − X − Y is
a Markov chain. Hence, L⋆(X → Y ) = 0. Now, we prove
the reverse. Assume that L⋆(X → Y ) = 0. This implies that
L(U → Y ) = 0 for all U such that U −X − Y is a Markov
chain. For the special case that U = X , L(U → Y ) = L(X →
Y ) = maxy∈JY K log2(|JXK|/|JX |Y (ω) = yK|) = 0 and hence
we must have |JX |Y (ω) = yK| = |JXK| for all y ∈ JY K.
Noting that JX |Y (ω) = yK ⊆ JXK and therefore |JX |Y (ω) =
yK| = |JXK| implies that JX |Y (ω) = yK = JXK. Hence, X
and Y must be unrelated.
Proof of (c): Notice that we have L(U → Y ) =
maxy∈JY K log2 (|JUK|/|JU |Y (ω) = yK|) ≤ log2(|JUK|) be-
cause |JU |Y (ω) = yK| ≥ 1. Further, we have |JUK| ≤ |JXK|.
Hence, L(U → Y ) ≤ log2(|JXK|) = H0(X) for all
U . Taking maximum of left hand side of this inequality
over all U results in (c). For Y = X , L(U → Y ) =
L(U → X) =maxx∈JXK log2 (|JUK|/|JU |X(ω) = xK|). Note
that JU |X(ω) = xK = {g(x)} is a singleton and, as a result,
|JU |X(ω) = xK| = 1. This implies that L(U → Y ) = |JUK|.
Further, |JUK| ≤ |JXK| with equality achieved if U = X .
Thus, L⋆(X → Y ) = supU : U−X−Y L(U → Y ) = H0(X).
Proof of (d): For U that holds Markov Chain U−X−Y −Z ,
we have L(U → Y ) ≥ L(U → Z). Taking maximum of both
sides of this inequality results in (d).
Proof of (e): We have L((Ui)ni=1 → (Yi)
n
i=1) =∑n
i=1 L(Ui → Yi) if (Ui, Xi, Yi), ∀i, are unrelated [11]. Note
that, by definition, (Ui, Xi, Yi), ∀i, are unrelated if (Xi, Yi),
∀i, are unrelated. Taking maximum from both sides of this
equality over (Ui)
n
i=1, such that (Ui)
n
i=1 − (Xi)
n
i=1 − (Yi)
n
i=1
forms a Markov chain, proves (e).
Now, we are ready to present a formula for computing
the maximal non-stochastic leakage. This is done in the next
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Computing Maximal Leakage). L⋆(X →
Y ) = log2(|JXK| −miny∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK|+ 1).
Proof: We start by proving that L⋆(X → Y ) ≤
log2(|JXK| − miny∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK| + 1). To do so, we
need to prove that, ∀y ∈ JY K,
|JXK| − |JUK| ≥ |JX |Y (ω) = yK| − |JU |Y (ω) = yK|. (3)
This is done by reductio ad absurdum. Assume that (3) does
not hold for all y ∈ JY K. Therefore, there must exists y ∈ JY K
such that
|JXK| − |JUK| < |JX |Y (ω) = yK| − |JU |Y (ω) = yK|, (4)
Subtracting |JUK\JU |Y (ω) = yK| from both sides of (4) results
in
|JXK| − |JUK| − |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK|
<|JX |Y (ω) = yK| − |JU |Y (ω) = yK|
− |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK|
=|JX |Y (ω) = yK| − |JUK|,
where the equality follows from that |JUK| = |JU |Y (ω) =
yK|+ |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK| because (JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK)∩
JU |Y (ω) = yK = ∅ and (JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK) ∪ JU |Y (ω) =
yK = JUK. Therefore, it must be that
|JXK| − |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK| < |JX |Y (ω) = yK|.
5or equivalently
|JXK| − |JX |Y (ω) = yK| < |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK|.
Because (JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = yK) ∩ JX |Y (ω) = yK = ∅ and
JXK =(JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = yK) ∪ JX |Y (ω) = yK, we have
|JXK| = |JXK\ JX |Y (ω) = yK|+ |JX |Y (ω) = yK|. Therefore,
it must be that
|JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = yK| < |JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK|. (5)
On the other hand, we have
|JUK \ JU |Y (ω) = yK|
=
∣∣{g(x) : x ∈ JXK} \ {g(x) : x ∈ JX |Y (ω) = yK}∣∣
=
∣∣{g(x) : x ∈ JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = yK}∣∣
≤
∣∣JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = yK∣∣,
which contradicts (5). Thus, (3) must be valid for all y ∈ JY K.
Using (3), we get
|JUK|
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|
≤
|JXK| − |JX |Y (ω) = yK|
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|
+ 1
≤ |JXK| − |JX |Y (ω) = yK|+ 1, ∀y ∈ JY K,
where the last inequality holds because
|JU |Y (ω) = yK| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x∈JX|Y (ω)=yK
JU |X(ω) = xK
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1. (6)
Using y∗ ∈ argminy∈JY K |JU |Y (ω) = yK|, we get
L(U → Y ) = log2
(
|JUK|
|JU |Y (ω) = y∗K|
)
≤ log2(|JXK| − |JX |Y (ω) = y
∗K|+ 1)
= log2(|JXK|− min
y∈JY K
|JX |Y (ω) = yK|+ 1). (7)
Since inequality (7) holds for all U , we have the proved upper
bound.
Now, we continue by proving the lower bound that L⋆(X →
Y ) ≥ log2(|JXK| −miny∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK|+1). Select an
arbitrary y∗ ∈ argminy∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK|. Let us define
two sets X1 := JX |Y (ω) = y∗K and X2 := JXK \ X1. Define
g : JXK → JUK with JUK = X2 ∪ {u∗} as
g(x) =
{
u∗, x ∈ X1,
x, x ∈ X2.
(8)
Note that, by construction, |JU |Y (ω) = y∗K| = |{u∗}| = 1
and |JU |Y (ω) = yK| = |g(JX |Y (ω) = yK)| ≥ 1 for all y ∈
JY K\{y∗}. Hence, miny∈JY K |JU |Y (ω) = yK| = 1. Therefore,
L⋆(X → Y ) ≥ L(U → Y )
= log2
 |JUK|
min
y∈JY K
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|

= log2(|JUK|)
= log2(|JXK \ JX |Y (ω) = y
∗K|+ 1)
= log2(|JXK| − |JX |Y (ω) = y
∗K|+ 1)
= log2(|JXK| − min
y∈JY K
|JX |Y (ω) = yK|+ 1).
This concludes the proof.
Remark 1. The function g in (8) constructs the most vul-
nerable attribute U of uv X , which is determined by any
y∗ ∈ argminy∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK|.
Corollary 5. L⋆(X → Y ) is not symmetric in general.
Proof: For uvs X and Y with joint range JX,Y K =
{(x1, y1), (x2, y1), (x3, y2)}, we have L⋆(X → Y ) =
log2(3) 6= log2(2) = L⋆(Y → X).
In the next section, we introduce non-stochastic identifia-
bility as a new notion of privacy, motivated by the expression
for the maximal leakage in Proposition 4.
V. NON-STOCHASTIC IDENTIFIABILITY
We define non-stochastic identifiability by requiring that the
ratio of the cardinality of the set of compatible realization
of uv X with access to the measurements of uv Y over
the cardinality of the set of compatible realization of uv X
without this auxiliary information is lower bounded by an
exponential of the privacy budget. This implies that access
to the realizations of Y does not significantly reduce the
cardinality of the set of possibilities that must be tested for
guessing the realization of X . This definition is in consistent
with stochastic identifiability in [22], [23] which requires that
the posterior distribution (instead of the conditional range) to
remain similar with and without access to privacy-preserving
measurements.
Definition 3 (Non-Stochastic Identifiability). Any mapping M
is ǫ-identifiable, for ǫ > 0, if
|JX |Y (ω) = yK| ≥ |JXK|2−ǫ, ∀y ∈ JY K, (9)
with Y = M ◦X .
We refer to ǫ in the non-stochastic identifiability as the
privacy budget. By decreasing the privacy budget, we ensure
a higher level of privacy (cf., differential privacy [24] and
identifiability [22]). This is intuitively because, by decreasing
the privacy budget, the size of the set JX |Y (ω) = yK increases
and thus guessing the actual realization of uvX becomes more
complex.
Corollary 6. For any ǫ-identifiable mapping M, L⋆(X →
Y ) ≤ log2(|JXK|(1 − 2
−ǫ) + 1).
Proof: The proof follows from that L⋆(X → Y ) =
log2(|JXK|−miny∈JY K |JX |Y (ω) = yK|+1) ≤ log2(|JXK|(1−
2−ǫ) + 1).
Corollary 6 shows that, as expected, the maximal non-
stochastic brute-force guessing leakage L⋆(X → Y ) goes to
zero as the privacy budget approaches zero. By increasing the
privacy budget, however, we increase the bound on the maxi-
mal non-stochastic brute-force guessing leakage L⋆(X → Y )
and therefore more private information could be potentially
leaked.
VI. BRUTE-FORCE TO ONE-SHOT GUESS
In the previous section, we considered a brute-force guess-
ing adversary that can potentially check all the possibilities of
6the private information in JU |Y (ω) = yK that are compatible
with the available outputs Y (ω) = y of the channel JY |XK
to find the actual private realization. In this section, we
restrict ourselves to one-shot guesses. We first analyze the
non-stochastic case and its relationship with the non-stochastic
brute-force guessing.
A. Non-Stochastic One-Shot Guessing
Let us consider an adversary with only a single opportunity
for guessing the private realization of uv U by observing
the realization of uv Y . For instance, consider the problem
of guessing a person’s password based on side-channel in-
formation (e.g., inter-keystroke delay as in [1]) while the
system locks immediately after one wrong guess. Therefore,
the adversary is interested in finding the largest amount of
information that can be deduced correctly with one guess. This
happens when |JU |Y (ω) = 1K| = 1 for all y ∈ JY K. In the
next proposition, we show that the maximum information is
the largest amount of information can be leaked to such an
adversary. We further relate this notion of leakage to maximal
non-stochastic leakage with brute-force guessing.
Proposition 7 (Maximal Leakage Bounds Maximin Info).
For uvs X and Y ,
I⋆(X ;Y ) = sup
U : U −X − Y,
|JU|Y (ω) = yK| = 1,
∀y ∈ JY K
L(U → Y ) ≤ L⋆(X → Y ),
where the supremum is taken over all g : JXK → JUK such
that |{g(x) : x ∈ JX |Y (ω) = yK}| = |JU |Y (ω) = yK| = 1.
Proof: The second inequality trivially follows from that
increasing the search domain of the supermum operator results
in a larger value. Therefore, we only focus on the first inequal-
ity. Note that |JU |Y (ω) = yK| = 1 implies that there exists f
such that U = f(Y ). Therefore, U = f(Y ) = g(X). Follow-
ing Lemma 1 in [19], we know that there exists a function h
such that U = h(X∧Y ), whereX∧Y is the common variable
in the sense of [19] defined for uncertain variables (instead of
random variables) following the approach of [18]. Therefore,
L(U → Y ) = H0(U) ≤ H0(X ∧ Y ) = I⋆(X ;Y ). Since this
inequality holds for all U such that JU |Y (ω) = yK = 1, we
get
sup
U : U −X − Y,
|JU|Y (ω) = yK| = 1,
∀y ∈ JY K
L(U → Y ) ≤ I⋆(X ;Y ).
On the other hand, for U∗ = X ∧ Y ,
sup
U : U −X − Y,
|JU|Y (ω) = yK| = 1,
∀y ∈ JY K
L(U → Y ) ≥ L(U∗ → Y ) = I⋆(X ;Y ).
Combining these inequalities concludes the proof.
Remark 2 (Relationship with Zero-Error Capacity). Following
Proposition 7 and [12], the zero-error capacity of any memo-
ryless uncertain channel satisfies C0 = supJXK⊆X I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤
supJXK⊆XL⋆(X → Y ). Therefore, based on Corollary 6, the
zero-error capacity of any memoryless ǫ-identifiable channel
is upper bounded by log2(|X|(1 − 2
−ǫ) + 1), where |X| is
the number of the input alphabets. This constraints dynamical
systems that can be estimated or stabilized through privacy-
preserving communication channels [12], [25].
In the next subsection, we consider one-shot guessing in the
stochastic sense of [1] and investigate its relationship with the
maximal non-stochastic leakage with brute-force guessing.
B. Maximal Stochastic Leakage
We can recreate the stochastic framework for information
leakage in [1] by endowing all the uncertain variables in this
paper with a measure.
Definition 4 (Maximal Stochastic Leakage). For jointly dis-
tributed rvs X and Y , the maximal stochastic leakage from
X to Y is given by
L˜(X → Y )
= sup
U : U−X−Y
log2
E
{
max
u∈JUK
P{U = u|Y = y}
}
max
u∈JUK
P{U = u}
 ,
where supremum is taken over all random variables (rvs) U
taking values in finite arbitrary alphabets. It was shown in [1]
that
L˜(X → Y ) = log2
 ∑
y∈JY K
max
x∈JXK
P{Y = y|X = x}

= I∞(X ;Y ),
where I∞ is the Sibson mutual information Iα in the order
α→∞ [17], [26]. Note the fact that {x : P{X = x} > 0} =
JXK.
In the next proposition, we show that the worst-case maxi-
mal stochastic leakage provides a bound for the maximal non-
stochastic brute-force leakage. Therefore, we can interpret the
maximal non-stochastic brute-force leakage as a robust non-
stochastic counterpart of the maximal stochastic leakage.
Proposition 8 (Relating Maximal Leakages). L⋆(X → Y ) ≤
sup
P{Y=y|X=x} L˜(X → Y ) +H0(X |Y ).
Proof: We start by proving that L⋆(X → Y ) ≤ H0(Y )+
H0(X |Y ). First, note that
JUK =
⋃
y′∈JY K
⋃
x′∈JX|Y (ω)=y′K
JU |Y (ω) = y′, X(ω) = x′K
=
⋃
y′∈JY K
⋃
x′∈JX|Y (ω)=y′K
JU |X(ω) = x′K,
because U −X − Y forms a Markov uncertainty chain. As a
result,
|JUK| =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
y′∈JY K
⋃
x′∈JX|Y (ω)=y′K
JU |X(ω) = x′K
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |JY K| max
y∈JY K
|JX |Y (ω) = yK|, (10)
7because |JU |X(ω) = xK| = 1 for all x ∈ JXK. Combining (6)
and (10) results in
|JUK|
min
y∈JY K
|JU |Y (ω) = yK|
≤ |JY K| max
y∈JY K
|JX |Y (ω) = yK|.
Therefore, L(X → Y ) ≤ H0(Y ) + H0(X |Y ) for
all U . This proves the upper bound L⋆(X → Y ) ≤
H0(Y ) + H0(X |Y ). The rest of the proof follows from
that sup
P{Y=y|X=x} L˜(X → Y ) = H0(Y ) because of [1,
Lemma 1 & Example 6].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We developed an interpretable notion of non-stochastic
information leakage based on guessing in a non-stochastic
framework. We considered brute-force guessing in which an
adversary can potentially check all the possibilities of the
private information that are compatible with the available
outputs to find the actual private realization. The ratio of the
worst-case number of guesses for the adversary in the presence
of the output and in the absence of it captures the reduction in
the adversary’s guessing complexity and is thus used as a mea-
sure of information leakage. We computed the maximal non-
stochastic leakage over all sensitive attributes that could be
targeted by the adversary and compared it with non-stochastic
identifiabiliy, maximin information, and stochastic maximal
leakage. Future work can focus on extending this definition to
a dynamic framework with continual observations.
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